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We construct a rational expectations model in which aggregate growth alternates between
a low growth and a high growth state. When all agents expect growth to be slow, the returns on
investment are low, and little investment takes place. This slows growth and confirms the prediction
that the returns on investment will be low. But if agents expect fast growth, investment is high,
returns are high, and growth is rapid, This expectational indeterminacy is induced by
complementarit y between different types of capital goods. In a growth cycle there are stochastic
shifts between high and low growth states and agents take full account of these transitions. The rules
that agents need to form rational expectations in this equilibrium are simple. The equilibrium with

















One of the oldest conjectures in economics holds that self-fulfilling shifts
in optimism or confidence can destabilize aggregate economic activity. Ag-
gregate investment, which is notoriously volatile, has long been suspected
of being susceptible to these fluctuations. 1 In this paper, we construct an
explicit model that exhibits this kind of exp~tational indeterminacy in in-
vestment. In a rational expect ations equilibrium, chang= in expectations
cause the economy to cycle back and forth between periods with high lev-
els of inv=tment and rapid GDP growth and periods with low levels of
invat ment and slow GDP growth.
In the last twenty years, economists have developed a number of models
wit h multiple perfect foresight equilibria and expectat ional indeterminacy.
In a perfect foresight solution, expectations can determine which equilib-
rium is realizd at time O, but agents form expectations on the assumption
that there is no uncertainty about which equilibrium will be selected in
future periods. In solutions with expectational indeterminacy agents also
take account of the fact that shifts in expectations will continue to influ-
ence the behavior of the economy at all future date. Despite the long-
standing interest in the role of expectations and their apparent relevance
for macroeconomic fluctuations, these models have not found a central place
in macroeconomic theory.
Part of the difficulty may derive from the different goals of pure and
applied theorists. Pure theorists have explored a variety of simple, artificial
models that have helped to clarify how multiple equilibria and expectational
indeterminacy can arise in a dynamic economy. However, some of these
models have implications that strike macroeconomists as wildly implausible.
For example, in monetary models, a constant money supply in a stationary
economy can lead to infinitely many equilibria with explosive pric= (Brock,
1975), Other results have turned out to be fragile. For example, introducing
a durable asset like land into an overlapping generations model can kill any
1For evidence on the volatility of investment relative to other components of GDP and
its high positive correlation with GDP, aee Table 1.1 in Blanchard and Fischer (1989) or
~ble 1.1 in Cooley and Prmcott (1995).equilibria with endogenous fluctuations, 2 Macroeconomists understandably
question the empirical relevance of all such models.
Our goal in this paper is to make a case for a mechanism that can gener-
ate expectat ional indeterminacy in r~l economies, This mechanism is based
on micro-foundations that are familiar and plausible. It fits the traditional
conjecture about inv~tment behavior, It does not rely on controversial =-
sumptions that make the model suspect on a ptiori thmretical grounds or
that distract from our basic m=sage about invmt ment, This means that
in contrast to some of the older models with expectational indeterminacy,
we eschew the use of overlapping generations and assume that agents are
infinitely lived. We also specify the model entirely in real terms, so there is
no fiat money. We assume that markets are complete, so agents can trade
securities with payoffs that are contingent on the state of the economy. We
do not assume that there are search related externalities in the labor mar-
ket. In a departure from many of the recent models of multiple equilibria,
we do not allow any production relationship to exhibit short-run incr=sing
returns to scale, or equivalently, to exhibit falling short-run marginal costs
of production.3
We also go beyond the mere demonstration that a rational expectations
equilibrium with growth cycles exists. We show that this equilibrium is
locally stable under a natural learning rule. As a result, arguments about
stability under learning that were used to dismiss some of the implausible
monetary equilibria cannot be used to rule out the behavior we identify.
Mormver, our equilibrium concept makes only mod~t information process-
ing demands on our agents. They do not need to formulate expectations
about complicated dynamic paths for any variables in the economy. In the
high and low growth statea, different GDP growth rates and market interest
rates will be observed. To make correct forecasts, agents need to know only
thee numbers, Under the learning process, they start with estimates for
them and update the intimates as they observe the realized values in the
high or low growth states.
The switches between fast and slow growth statm are signaled by a
random policy variable. As we explain later, we think of this variable as
an indicator of monetary policy, which can be restrictive or expansive. 4
2S- the discussion of this point in Woodford (1991).
3Section 4 contains a detailed discussion of how our model fits into the literature.
41n an emPirical +Udy Kafinsky (1993) has employd a two state classification of
2Because we do not introduce fiat money into our economy, monetary policy
merely acts as a signal. For our purposes, it is sufficient to think of the
policy variable as a traffic signal installed on the top of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York that switches between red and green, Agents learn
the transition probabilities between red and green directly by watching the
signal or equivalently by observing the behavior of the economy over time.
We do not treat monetary policy this way because we think that mone-
tary non-neutralities are irrelevant or trivial. On the contrary, we intend our
model as a justification for the claim that monetary disturbances with small
direct effects can nevertheless have large macroeconomic consequence. Be-
cause it is simpler, we go to the limit and assume that the direct effects are
vanishingly small, Bringing small direct effects back into the model would
make the case for the importance of monetary policy even stronger.
The crucial assumption in the model specifi= how dfierent types of
capital goods interact in produdion. We assume that they are comple-
ments. Their interact ions are analogous to those between dump trucks and
front-end loaders or between personal computers, laser printers, and digi-
tal communication networks. Having more of one type of good rais~ the
marginal productivity of the others, The ultimate r=ult from the model is
exact ly what an intuition based on the notion of strategic complementarily
would suggest,5 If the quant iti= of capital goods that are complements with
your good are going up, this raisin the marginal productivity of your good.
Hence, at constant pric~, the quantity demanded goes up. Therefore, you
produce more, just like everyone else, If you are already in business, you ex-
pand output faster than you would otherwise have done. If you are not yet
in busines, now is the time to enter, In our equilibrium, this self-reinforcing
process is strong enough to be self-sustaining.
This intuition captures the essence of the argument, but the details are
not simple. By itself, complementarily between different type of inv=t-
ment goods is not enough to generate growth cycles, An argument first
outlined by Cass and Shell (1983) shows that the kind of expectational in-
determinacy exhibited by our model cannot arise if the model satisfies all of
the assumptions required to prove that equilibria are Pareto optimal, We
make only one depart ure from the standard assumptions. We intreduce
FOMC announcements into “expansionary” and “restrictive” monetary policy regimes.
5S- Cooper and John (1988) for a discussion of the mncept of strategic
complement arity,
3a nonconvexity. Specifically, we assume that a firm must incur a fixed re-
search and development cost before it can produce a new type of investment
good. Producers of investment goods have patent rights over the designs
that result. They charge the simple monopoly price for their goods. Physi-
cal units of the invetment goods are produced under conditions of constant
returns to scale. This is characterized by falling average cost but constant
marginal cost. Each monopolist also faces a constant elasticity demand
curve, so prices are a constant markup over cost. The resulting equilibrium
is characterized by a familiar form of monopolistic competition with a large
number of small firm. Again, in cent rast to other models, we do not allow
for any strategic interactions between firm. The elasticity of demand faced
by any monopolist do= not change over time. The demand curve faced by
each monopolist has no kinka. All these other elements and more could be
added to the model, but they are not central to the story that we tell.
Our immediate goal is to show that by themselves, our two basic assump-
tions - complementarily of investment goods and endogenous innovation
motivated by monopoly power - are sufficient to generate robust, endoge-
nous fluct uat ions in aggregate investment, To make our point as simply
and as convincingly as possible, we abstract from many issues that would
be important in a complete model of business cycle fluctuations and macro-
economic policy. For example, a more realistic specification would allow
for many different kinds of capital goods, some of which are substitutes for
ach other (mini-computers and desktop computers) and some of which are
complements with each other (computers and laser printers). Alwyn Young
(1993) us= this kind of model in his demonstration that multiple perfect
foresight endogenous growth rates are possible. 6 We use a specification
that allows only for complements because it simplifies the formal analysis
when we undertake the difficult task of constructing a rational expectations
model with endogenous switching between growth rat=. (We return to a
discussion of complementarily and substitution in the concluding section
since this issue is central to any attempt to gauge the aggregate importance
of complementarities. ) We also assume that the supply of labor is fixed and
that the labor market always clars. Finally, as we have already noted, we
do not allow for any real effects awociated with monetary policy.
6Strictly spcaking, this is true in Young’s model if one reinterprets the utility function
for each type of good in his model as being a part of the technoloW, w that a what he
calls the utility from each good is a kind of produced output.
4These last two assumptions make our model simpler and our r~ults
even stronger, If we allowed for more complicated labor market dynamics
or for nominal non-neutralities, the set of possible fluctuations would be
even richer. Our simple model is more useful for our theoretical purposes,
but it is clearly too r~trictive for policy analysis, A trivial implication of
the model as it stands is that welfare is always higher when monetary policy
is expansive. We recognize that a complete treatment of monetary policy
would take account of its effects on inflation, We also understand that
unemployment is a real feature of the labor market that a more complete
model would have to address.
Because of the simplifying assumptions that we make, we do not believe
that our model is one that can be taken directly to the data. In this sense,
our ambition is more modat than that of authors who have tried to justify
the empirical plausibility of key parameters or to calibrate models with
various forms of indeterminacy. Our sense is that the main task now is
to make a convincing case for the plausibility of an underlying mechanism
that is capable of generating expect at ional indeterminacy. Calibrat ion and
empirical t=ting will come later.7
At present, the main competitor with the mechanism based on comple-
mentarily that we emphasize is short-run increasing returns to scale. Al-
though there are macro~onomic estimates which suggest that this kind of
incr-ing return might be present, these estimates are controversial.s As a
result, macroeconomic evidence is likely to play a decisive role in establishing
or refuting the plausibility of any proposed mechanism. We suspect that
the macroeconomic evidence concerning complementarities will ultimately
prove to be more compelling than evidence about short-run, increasing re-
turns to scale and falling short-run marginal cost. This is why we emphasize
complementarities. In the concluding section, we describe how the model
needs to be extended before qu=tions about plausible parameter values can
realist ically be addr~sed,
Despite our best efforts, the complete model is still fairly complicated.
We develop it in stages. We start in Section 2 by d=cribing the underlying
perfect-for= ight, balanced-growt h model. Under the assumption that there
is no uncertainty, we show that from any initial condition, this “model poss-
‘Sm Benhabib and Rustichini (1994) for the mntrary argument, that calibration is the
next order of busine= for macroeconomists interested in models with multiple equilibria.
8See for example, the discussion in Benhabib and Farmer (1994).
5mat hree possible balanced growth paths. Two of the thrm perfect foresight
growth rates are stable under learning, We look in a neighborhood of these
for our high and low growth stat= in the extension with random switches.
Then, in Section 3, we describe the extension that brings uncertainty
into the model and converts it from a model with multiple perfect foresight
equilibria into a fully specified model with expectational indeterminacy. We
introduce a policy variable that is a two-state Markov process. One state
signals expansion. The other signals contract ion. In equilibrium, all agents
understand that all other agents rely on this signal to predict whether the
economy is currently in a high or low growth state. We calculate the equi-
librium, letting agents take account of the random switches between future
growth rates that will now be present. The previous analysis of distinct
perfect foresight equilibria thereby becom= a special case of the analysis
of a single stochastic rational expectations equilibrium that alternat= be-
tween high and low growth states. Finally, we verify that this rational
expectations equilibrium is stable under learning. Specifically, we prove an
existence result demonstrating that a locally stable equilibrium must exist.
We also compute an explicit example and use the learning algorithm as a
numerical procedure to calculate the equilibrium growth and interest rates.
2 The Perfect Foresight Growth Model
2.1 Modeling Strategy
Because the equilibria of interest to us are not Pareto optimal, we cannot
calculate them by solving an optimization problem. Because we do not want
to restrict attention to the behavior of the wonomy in the neighborhood of
a steady state, we cannot simplify the system of equations that determine a
dynamic equilibrium by linearizing around a st=dy state. We will therefore
be forced to find distinct, explicit solutions to an infinite system of equations
in an infinite number of unknowns. To keep things manageable, we will make
use of a few key simplifying assumptions that let us reduce this infinite
dimensional problem to an equivalent finite dimensional problem.
The two most important simplifying assumptions are that there is a sin-
gle state variable and that the preferences and technology are homogeneous.
As we will show, this means that the economy looks the same at every date.
6The only difference is that all opportunities are scaled up by the stock of the
single state variable, In effect, this reduces the problem of calculating an
infinite path for dated consumption goods and dated stocks of capital to the
simpler, finite dimensional problem of calculating the constant proportional
amount by which consumption and the state variable grow in each period.
If we had more than one state variable, we would have to be concerned with
transition dynamics associated with chang= in the ratios of two or more
state variabl=.
The homogeneity that we need is an inherent feature of any model that
generates balanced growth — that is, in which all quantities grow at con-
stant exponential rates, We will build our model using pieces that are fa-
miliar from exist ing models of balanced growth.
Our preference structure is standard, We assume. that there is a repre-
sentative consumer who maximizm the discounted expression for utility,
~p’+’u(ct+i)
i=cl
When we introduce uncertainty later in the paper, the consumer will max-
imize expected utility. We also use the standard isoelastic expression for
the utility derived from consumption in each period: U(c) = ~. This
specification gives us the homogeneity we need on the preference side of the
model. A consumer who is faced with a constant interest rate r, will choose




= [p(l +rt)]’/u . (1)
We will characterize our infinite dimensional equilibria in terms of two equa-
tions in two endogenous variables: the interest rate and the rate of growth.
This expr~sion giv- us one of the two relationships. The second corn=
from an arbitrage condition from the technology side of the model. Because
our technology is complicated, we proceed in steps, illustrating the relation-
ships between r and g that emerge in simpler models and working up to the
relationship for our full model.
72.2 Linear Production
The simpl=t production structure is one in which output is linear in the
stock of capital and in which there is a one-for-one trade-off between new
capital and consumption:
Y~ = BKt (2)
Kt+l – Kt = Y~–ct. (3)
This is an example of what is now called an “AK” or linear growth model.
(We use the symbol “B” instead of “A” to avoid confusion with a later
use of A.) The correct interpretation of this accumulation equation is that
consumption goods and capital goods are produced in different sectors that
use the same production technology, In this case, the production possibility
frontier between additions to the capital stock and units of consumption
goods is linear. The model can therefore be treated as if it has a single pro-
ductive sector. By a suitable choice of units, the trade-off between capital
and consumption goods can be taken to be one-for-one.
The behavior of this trivial model can be characterized by a graph that
plots the quilibrium interest rate as a function of the equilibrium growth
rate as in Figure 1. The upward sloping curve in this plot comes from equa-
tion (1) and is labeled the preference curve. The horizontal line, which is
labeled “one sector technology” is determined by arbitrage on the produc-
tion side of the model. Arbitrage implies the equality r = B. The inter-
section determines the equilibrium inter~t rate and growth rate. Because
of the homogeneity of the model, the implied values for r and g determine
everything about the equilibrium start ing from any initial stock of capital
K..
A second “technology” curve, which is downward sloping, characterizes
the no-arbitrage condition when the production functions for producing
consumption and capital goods are different. Suppose that the production
possibility frontier between additions to the stock of capital and consump-
tion is nonlinear. The traditional way to specify this would be to assume a
functional form for production in each sector and derive the expression for
the production pmsibility frontier, Instead, we take a short-cut by assum-
ing a simple functional form for the production possibility frontier itself,










Figure 1: Perfect foresight equilibria under two different technology=
can be produced. Suppose that output of consumption goods is related to
increases in the capital stock aa follows:
“=K-K’x(K’+~:K’)
(4)
In the exprewion, x(.) can be any increasing, convex cost function with
x(O) = 0. Note that this kind of specification impo- the homogeneity of
degree one in the state variable K that we need on the production side of the
model. Note also that this reduces to equation (3) in the case where x is the
identity function. With this specification, the price of capital goods in units
of consumption goods will be the derivative of consumption with r=pmt
to the stock of capital tomorrow, which we can write as X’(gK), where
K*+I–Kt gK =
Kk One unit of consumption can now be inv=tecf to yield r units
of additional consumption goods in each period. Alternatively, it can be
used to purchase X’(gK)– 1units of capital, which will yield a flow of ~ units
of consumption goods in each period. Thus, a no-arbitrage condition on the
technolo~ side of the model impos= the equality r = &. Because x(. )
is convex, this expr=sion yields the downward sloping curve labeled “two
9sector tmhnology” in Figure 1,
Two featurm of this kind of model make this simple diagrammatic char-
acterization of equilibria possible for both of th~e models. First, the accu-
mulation equation for capital, (3) or (4), implies that if capital, output, and
consumption grow at constant multiplicative rates, this rate must be the
same for all three variables. The equilibrium can therefore be characterized
using a common growth rate g = gc = gK. Second, because of the homo-
geneity of the specifications for preference and the technology, the curv=
in the figure do not depend on the level of the state variable K. These two
features will carry over to elaborations of this basic structure that allow
for fixed costs of invention and complementarily between types of capital
goods.
2.3 Many Capital Goods
To bring invention into the analysis, we start with the model of growth
taken from Romer (1987), This model allows for the introduction of new
types of capital goods, but its equilibrium behavior closely r-embles the
behavior of the one-sector model described above. Output of consumption
goods is a function of labor (assumed in fixed supply) and the quantities of
a large number of specialized capital goods:
F(L, z(.)) = LA z(z)~dz. (5)
In this expression, the running index z indexes different types of capital
goods. The expression Z(Z) denotes the number of units of capital of type i
that are in use. The upper limit A indicates the range of capital goods that
have already been dmigned and can therefore be produced. Although it
would be more natural to let the index z and the upper bound A be integer
valued and to replace the integral by a sum, we use the continuous version
specified here to avoid the distractions associated with integer constraints.
In addition to the production of final output, there are two other pro-
ductive activities — inventing new typ= of capital goods and producing
physical machines of each of the many existing types of capital goods. By
analogy with the one s~tor model d=cribed above, we can assume that the
same production technology described by the functional F(. ) can be used in
all productive activities: making consumption goods, d=igns for new typ~
10of machinea, and physical machin= themselves. With the same production
technology, the tradeoff between the dflerent types of output is linear. We
can therefore denote total output (which is the same as the maximum feasi-
ble output of consumption goods) as Yt = F(L, z(.)). Assume that it takes
one unit of forgone consumption to make each additional unit of any type
of machine and that it takes a units of forgone consumption to produce
a daign for an entirely new type of machine. Then total output is split
according to
Yt = Ct + a(At+l – At) + Kt+l – Kt,
where Kt is defined as the total stock of machin= measured in units of the





The market structure in this model is monopolistically competitive. Any
firm that dmigns a new machine gets a patent on the design. It produces
machines and charges the simple monopoly price for these machines. In
equilibrium, the intermt rate r adjusts so that the pr=ent discounted value
of the rmulting monopoly profits is just equal to the cost a of inventing a
new type of machine. The zero profit condition in this equilibrium implies
that at every date, the ratio of At to Kt is constant so we can work with a
single aggregate state variable Zt = aAt + Kt thatsummarizes the effects
of all previous investment decisions. The accumulation equation can then
be written as
Yt = Ct +Zt+l– Zt.
It turns out that the reduced form expression for output Y as a function
of accumulation to date Z is linear in Z. As a r=ult, the intertemporal zero
profit condition is satisfied at a unique value of the inter=t rate r. This value
of r is independent of the state variable Zt, (See Romer, 1987, for details
concerning the claims made about this model. ) As a result, the analysis of
growth is exactly as depicted in the single sector version of the technology
in Figure 1, The production technology determin= a unique interat rate.
The preference specification then yields the rate of growth for the economy.
112.4 Capital Goods that are Complements
As the introduction makes clear, our main interest lies in capital goods
that are complements with each other. To see how we can bring this into
the model, note that equation (5) uses a constant-elast icit y-of-substitution
aggregator to summarize the effect on output of all the different typ~ of
capital goods. If we reduce the model to the special case with only two
discrete capital goods, the production function takes the form
F(L, Zl,zz) = L1-~(x; + z;).
As it stands, this make production additively separable in goods 1 and
2, To make them complements or substitutes, one need only introduce an
additional exponent on the capital aggregate:
If we impose the restriction ~~ = a, then we prmerve homogeneity of degree
1. For values of @ greater than 1, the two capital goods ~i will be comple-
ments; an increase in the quantity of one raises the marginal product of
the other. Generalizing this idea, we can write the many-good, continuous-
index version of this expression aa follows:
In the additively separable model outlined above, it took a constant
amount of forgone consumption to produce each deign for a new type of
capital good. In an extension that makes the capital goods complements,
this specification for the technology for producing d~igns would lead to
explosive growth. Later designs would be more valuable bmause there are
more complements around that raise the value of a new capital good. The
incentives for discovering new goods would then grow rapidly over time. One
simple way to offset this increased incentive is to assume that there is also
a higher cost for designing goods with a higher index, Specifically, we will
assume that it tak= it units of forgone output to produce a design for good
i. In equilibrium, the increasd incentives for discovering new goods that
12come from complementarily will just offset the increased costs of discovery




If this restriction do= not hold, the model will exhibit rata of growth that
are locally incrming or decreasing over time. The model would be eco-
nomically sensible (provided some force keeps growth rates from becoming
too large), but it would no longer be pmsible to solve for a single, constant
growth rate as we did in Figure 1 for the linear production model. The
values for r and g would be changing over time.
Our ‘strategy is therefore to impose this r=triction (6) and look for equi-
libria in the subspace consisting of paths exhibiting constant exponential
growth. Bmause our functional form is a special case of all possible func-
tional forms and bwause our solution space is a subspace of all possible
dynamic paths, any forms of behavior that are possible in our restricted
model will a jortzori be possible in a 1=s restrictive analysis.
In the extended model with complements, we can still write the accu-
mulation equation for the single state variable as
Yt = Ct + Zt+l– Zt.
The only difference arises in the slightly more complicated relationship be-
tween the stock of total capital Z and the other state variabl=. At date t,







Zt = Zt(z)dz + i<da= Kt + i<di. (7)
o 0 0
The first term, Kt, represents cumulative total investment in machina. (So
far, we have been ignoring the possibility that machin= depreciate. We will
introduce this complication later, ) The second term dmcribes cumulative
tot al investment in the production or discovery of new d=igns.
The analysis of the perfect foresight, monopolistically competitive equi-
librium for this model proceeds exactly as it did in the model where the
capital goods have additively separable effects on production. (Details are
given in the appendk.) The fundamental arbitrage result is derivd from
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Figure2: Perfect for=ight equilibria with complementary inputs
key result that emerg~ from this analysis is that the no-arbitrageor zero
profit relationship implied by the technology yields an upward sloping locus
of (r, g) pairs asillustrated in Figure2. Inthiscase, thegrowth rate grefers
to the common growth rate for Yt, Ct, and Zt. Because deigns are getting
~+1 Be_ more costly, g,4 is smaller than g. In fact, one can show that g = gA
cause the preference relationship is also upward sloping, these curves may
intersect more than once. For appropriate parameter valu=, they intersect
twice, as illustrated in Figure 2. This means that the model has two dis-
tinct perfect for=ight equilibria. For any given initial value of Zt, there is
one perfect for~ight equilibrium in which the values for Yt, Ct, and Z~ all
grow at the high rate determined by the upper intersection. There is also
a second perfect foresight equilibrium in which they grow at the low rate
determined by the lower intersection of the two curvm.
The intuition behind the upward slope of the technolo~ locus is fun-
damental to all of the r=ults that follow. Because of the complementarily
between goods, a firm that invents a new type of good today will face a de-
mand for its good that increasm with the quantities and varieti= of other
goods that are introduced tomorrow. Suppose that we start from an inter-
14=t rate and a growth rate that yields zero intertemporal profits. Consider
an increase in the rate of growth of the economy, If Kt and At grow more
rapidly, the present discounted value of its stream of future profits gener-
ated by a new invention would be higher if the interest rate remained the
same. Competition for resources by potential new entrants will therefore
drive up the intermt until the present discounted value of the future profits
is driven back down to the cost of inventing a new good.
2.5 Stability under Learning
It is tempting to use the relatively simple model characterized in Figure 2 as
the basis for a model of macroeconomic fluct uat ions. At any date, there is
nothing that forces the economy to stay with one equilibrium or the other.
One could imagine, therefore, that chang= in expectations could cause the
economy to switch between the high and low growth stat=,
This intuition is partly right, but there are two difficulties that must
be faced before this argument can be made precise, First, this model is a
model of multiple perfect foreight equilibria. The rate of growth at each
of the two equilibria is calculated on the assumption that the economy will
stay forever at that equilibrium. Once we allow for the pmsibility that the
aggregate economy can switch bet ween equilibria, then we must also let
agents take account of this possibility when they form their expectations,
We will deal explicitly with this issue in the next section, where we formally
introduce a solution concept that allows for expectat ional indeterminacy,
The second issue suggested by the analysis in Figure 2 concerns stability.
Whenever we see two equilibria in an economic model, we have come to
expect that one of them will be stable and that the other will be unstable.
The goal in this section is to identify the precise sense in which one can
speak of an equilibrium point as being stable or unstable. Then we will
modify the model so that it has three perfect formight quilibria, two on
the ends that are stable and one in the middle that is unstable.
We emphasize that it does not make sense to think of three equilibria
as being stable or unstable in the usual sense, In the usual model, the
quantit i= evolve along explicit trajectories. Which trajectory the economy
follows is determined by the initial conditions. From a given initial position,
the equilibrium dynamics take the economy away from some steady state
points and toward others. In this setting, stability is used to distinguish
15between resting points that will be reached from a large class of initial
values for the state variables and rating points that can be reached only
from a measure zero set of initial values for the state variabl~,
This kind of analysis does not apply to our model. It has only one state
variable and the dynamic equations that determine the growth rate do not
depend on the level of this state variable. As a result, the initial conditions
do not pin down a starting point in the (r, g) space illustrated in Figure 2.
For any initial value of the state variable Z, the economy can select either of
the perfect foresight paths characterized by the intersections in the figure,
We can, however, inquire into the stability properties of the equilibria by
going outside of the perfect foresight model and asking what the dynamics
would be if agents had to learn about the equilibrium values of variabl= by
observing the behavior oft he economy itself. If plausible learning dynamics
lead the agents away from some perfect foresight equilibria and toward other
equilibria, we can use this difference to distinguish between more and less
plausible perfect foresight equilibria, That is, we can use stability under the
learning dynamics as a selection criterion when there are multiple equilibria,
In modeling learning, we r=trict attention to a simple scheme in which
households base thek actions on an expected interest rate. Given their be-
liefs about interest rates, consumers decide how much to save. Firms observe
the current savings behavior oft he consumers and project this behavior into
the indefinite future. Given their beliefs about current and future savings
behavior, firms will compete for resources in financial markets. This de-
termin~ a realized interest rate that is consistent with no-arbitrage on the
product ion side of the market. After consumers observe the realized rates,
they adjust their exp~tations about future inter~t rates. For example, if
the inter=t rate that consumers expected was lower that the interest rate
that is realized, they will revise their for-asts of inter=t rat= upward.
Out of equilibrium, both firms and consumers make mistak~. Con-
sumers use the wrong interest rate for their projections of current and future
intcrest rat=. Firms project the current savings behavior of consumers into
the future, but consumers will modify their savings behavior as they update
their estimate of the interest rate. If one of the perfect foresight equilibria is
stable, this process will converge to the equilibrium if it starts from nearby
values for ~ and g. As it does, these mistakes become smaller. In the limit,
at the equilibrium valu= for the inter=t rate and the growth rate, these
rules lead to correct forecasts by both firms and consumers. Interest rates
16and growth rat= are constant and no revisions are necessary.
To conduct the learning analysis it is necessary to extend the model
to a temporary quilibrium framework that captures th=e assumptions.
Fortunately, this analysis can be carried out using the same curves that
characterize the equilibrium in (r, g) space. Given an expected intermt rate
r’, households choose their saving to generate the rate of growth of wealt h
and consumption implied by equation (1), the equation that determines the
preference curve in Figure 2. Firms take this growth rate of consumption
and the implied, and equal, growth rate of total capital Z as given and
project it into the future, At this expected growth rate for the economy,
there is a unique realized inter=t rate that is consistent with no-arbitrage on
the technology side of the market. This is the value of r that is determined
by inserting the given growth rate into the technology curve in the figure.
If we take the composition of these two operations, we have a mapping that
takes expected interest rat es into realized interest rat=. Let us denote this
mapping as follows:
(8)
By construction, the interest rates corresponding to perfect foresight bal-
ancd growth paths are fixed points of T.
To generate an explicit dynamics for the interest rate, we use an adaptive
learning scheme,
T;+l = r: +dt(rt— T:), (9)
where bt = ~. The sequence {tit} is known as the gain sequence. It deter-
mines the extent of the adjustment of expectations to forecast errors. A
decreasing squence {bt} impli= that consumers become less responsive to
forecast errors as more data accumulates. For example, with 6 = 1 and ap-
propriate initial values, equation (9) impli= that r:+ 1 is equal to the average
of past valua of rt, This kind of learning rule is particularly appropriate in
an extension of this model which allows for small stochastic shocks, but we
do not introduce three shocks explicitly into the analysis here. Together,
equation (9) and the mapping rt = T(rf) define a dynamic system which
can be analyzed in the vicinity of a fixed point. (For a general discussion
of these kinds of learning algorithms, see the review paper by Evans and
Honkapohja, 1995a. For a discussion of learning around stmdy states, see
Evans and Honkapohja, 1995b.) If we linearize this system around a steady
17state, we can show that the fixed point is locally stable if T’(r) < 1. (If the
parameter 6t were equal to one so that the sequence of valua for r’ was
determined simply by iterates of T, we would have to impose the additional
condition T’(r) > – 1. However, 6t goes to zero, so we do not have to worry
about instabilityy caused by overshooting in the adjustment process. )
As experience suggests, the two equilibria in Figure 2 have different sta-
bility properties. The function T is the compmition of the two functions
graphed in the figure, At points where they intersect, the size of T’ relative
to 1 is determined by the relative slope of the two curvm. A simple geo-
metrical argument shows that it is the lower equilibrium that is stable under
lmrning. In Figure 2, r~ denotes an expected interest rate that is below the
inter~t rate in the low-growth perfect for=ight equilibrium and rfi denote
an expected interest rate that is also below the interest rate in the high-
growth equilibrium. As the figure shows, when the mapping T is applied
to r;, it lads to a value T(r~ ) that is above r~, so adjustment moves the
expected inter=t rate in the right direction. In contrast, when applied T is
applied to rfi, it l=ds to a value that is below rfi, so the learning dynamics
drives the economy away from the high growth equilibrium.g
If one accepts, as we do, the notion that any perfect foresight equilibrium
that is unstable under simple learning rules is unlikely to be realized in
practice, one is forced to conclude that the kind of multiplicity exhibited in
Figures 2 is unlikely to have any practical relevance. To have a candidate
for a model with multiple stable perfect forezight equilibria, we will need a
model that generatm more intersections of the two curves in this figure.
2.6 Multiple Stable Perfect Foresight Equilibria
Careful readers will no doubt have guessed where the argument is now
headed. We showed in the analysis of Figure 1 that a two-sector structure
that generat= a standard, nonlinear trade-off between the production of
gNote that there are alternative ways of formulating the temporary equilibrium and
mrresponding learning rules. For example, firms could instead have expected growth rate
g; with the actual growth rate and interest rate in a tempor~ equilibrium determined
by inferring r from the arbitrage condition for ks from the technolog side of the
model, tafcing g~ a given. Next, we could let mmumers select the rate of growth of
mnsumption and wealth from off of the preference curve. A learning scheme g: ~ for
fires could then be b-cd on the forecast erro= gz, t – gj, ~. It can be easily verfie~ that
a steady state is stable under (9) if and only if it is stable under this alternative scheme.
18investment goods and consumption goods tends to make the technology
curve slope down in (r, g) space. We have just shown that complementarily
between dflerent types of capital goods tends to make the technology curve
slope up. If we combine th=e two elements in the same model, we should
be able to make the curve have increasing and decreasing segments, so it
can intersect the preference curve arbitrarily often.
Specifically, we adopt the spectication for the production possibility
frontier between consumption and inv=tment that we used previously. Thus,
the accumulation quation for Z now takes the form
Ct= Yt – Ztx(
Zt+l – Zt– Dt
) Zt (lo)
As in the previous specification, x(.) is a convex cost function. In this
expression, we have also included a term Dt that takes account of any
depreciation of the physical capital stock. As in the previous model with
complements, the total stock of Z is related to the stock of designs and







Zt = z~(i)dz + icda = Kt •l- ~tda. (11)
0 0 0
This specification implim that the production function for producing ma-
chines and inventions is the same so that there is a linear production possi-
bility frontier between these two types of goods. However, equation (10) tells
us that this common production function is different from the production
function for making consumption goods. Of course, we could also allow for
a nonlinear production possibility frontier between designs and machines.
For example, one might want to capture the notion that invention and de-
sign work should be more labor intensive and less capital intensive than the
p~oduction of machines. However, pr~erving the linar frontier between A
and K gives us a major simplification in the structure of the model: this is
the crucial assumption that reduca the state variables Kt and At to a single
state variable Zt. Finally, we assume that physical machines depreciate at
the exponent ial rate d but that design blueprints to not depreciate, so Dt
can be exprased as Dt = dKt. In all other respmts, the model is the same
as the previous model with complement arit ies.
Figure 3 illustrates one type of simple equilibrium that we have gen-
erated using this combined structure, The downward sloping portions of
19r
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Figure 3: Perfect formight equilibria with complements and a two-sector
technology
the twhnology curve represent points where the curvature in the produc-
tion possibility frontier between consumption goods and invest ment goods
is high so its effects overwhelm the effects of complementarily, The upward
sloping portions of the technology curve represent regions where the produc-
tion possibility frontier is relatively flat, so the effects of complementarily
dominate. As the analysis in the last section suggests, the middle equilib-
rium will be unstable under learning. The low and high growth equilibria
will be stable under learning.
Table 1 reports values oft he growth rate and the interest rate in the
high and low growth equilibria in the basic parameterization of the model.
(Numerical valu= for the parameters are given in Appendix Al.) By con-
struct ion, the interest rates in these two equilibria were arbitrarily set at
4% and 5~o respectively. The corresponding growth rates for Z, C, and Y
are 0.2~o per year and 4.9~o per year. The table also reports the values for
p=, the price of the inv=tment goods relative to consumption goods. In the
high growth state, where a larger fraction of GDP is devoted to investment,
inv~tment goods are more expensive to produce on the margin, so their
20pric= are higher. Even though investment goods are more expensive in the
high growth state, a higher level of investment can be sustained because
of the positive reinforcing effects that result from the complementarities
between the different types of investment goods.





There are a few technical details that we have to address to convince the
reader that we have not violated any of the basic rules in the construction
of equilibrium models. We mention theee briefly here and leave the details
for the appendix, First, there is another parameter restriction t hat we must
impose to insure that the maximum feasible growth rate in this economy
does not yield infinite discounted utility. We impose this r=triction in our
specification of the production pmsibility frontier between investment goods
and consumption goods. It implies that there is a maximum feasible rate of
growth for Z. Beyond this rate, the marginal cost of additional investment
becomes infinite. Figure 4 illustrates the nature of the implied production
possibility frontier between Zt+l and Ct for a given level of Zt. The two
regions of sharp curvature corr=pond to the two downward sloping regions
of the technology curve in figure 3. This picture also mak= it clear that we
are not relying on the any assumptions about short-run increasing returns
in the production of new investment goods. Some models generate multiple
growth rat= by assuming that because of these kinds of short run increasing
returns, investment goods are cheaper when a larger fraction of total output
is devoted to investment. We generate multiple growth rates despite the fact
that investment goods are more expensive when investment is higher and
growth is more rapid. We reiterate that the only nonconvexity in the model
is the fixed cost associated with invention. All of the work that is done by
increasing returns in other models is done here by complementarily.
We have also chosen our parameters so that the rate of growth of Z and
(and hence also A) are positive in both of our perfect for=ight equilibria.






Figure 4: PPF between consumption and next period’s stock of total capital
add the restrictions At+l > At and Kt+l z (1 — d)Kt, and thereby rule
out the possibility that existing designs or machin= can be converted into
consumption goods or that dwigns could be converted into machin= and
vice versa. Likewise, non-negativity of consumption has to be checkd,
Given our parameter values, this constraint is satisfied.
3 Growth Cycles with Expectational Indeter-
minacy
3.1 Equilibrium fluctuations
So far, we have construct a model with two stable perfect foresight equi-
libria. These are building blocks in our complete model of fluctuations
between high and low growth states, but by themselv= they do not con-
stitute a model of this phenomenon. The figures in Table 1 illustrate why.
Suppose that the economy were to change from the high growth state to the
22low growth state. The price p= on each piece of capital would fall from 2.5
to 1.1. In the calculation of the perfect foresight equilibrium, we assumed
that this shift could never take place, so consumers make their savings de-
cisions wit bout taking any account of the possibilityy of this large capital
loss on their asset holdin~. When consumers make their decisions about
how much to consume and save, we must allow them to take account of the
switch= between high and low growth states that will actually take place
in equilibrium.
Formally, we can do this by introducing a random variable that has no
effect on preferenc~ or the opportunities that consumers and firms face.
‘This random variable St matters only because agents use it to forwast the
behavior of the economy. This kind of “extrinsic uncertainty” is susceptible
to various interpretations. For a discussion, see for example the chapter
on “Market Psychology” in Azariadis (1993). As we suggest in the intro-
duction, we prefer to think of this random variable as something that is
under the control of policy makers. In a more complete model, we would
let this variable have two effects: a small direct effect on the fundamentals
in the economy and a larger indirect effect that acts through its effects on
expectations. The small direct effects would explain why agents first began
to pay att ent ion to the value of this variable. Nevertheless, to keep our
analysis simple and to highlight the expectational effects that it can induce,
we assume that the direct eff=ts are negligible.
To keep this part of the model as simple as possible, we assume that
St switch= randomly between two states with fixed transition probability ies.
These transition probabilities will be exogenous parameters in our analysis.
In the “high” state firms and households (corrwtly) anticipate higher in-
vestment and more rapid growth during the coming period. However, they
also take full account of the probability of a switch to the low growth state
in future periods. Formally, we let St take values from {1,2} and assume
that it follows a two-state Markov chain with transition probabilities IIij for
Z,~ = 1, 2. Thee transition probabilities are exogenously given parameters,
Formally, all of the traditional elements in the specification of our model
— the preferences and the technology — remain the same after we introduce
s. All that changes is that in our calculation of an equilibrium, we look for
solutions to the equations generated by the model in a larger solution space.
In the calculation of perfect foresight equilibria, we did not let consumers
or firms make decisions that are cent ingent on s. Now we do. We already
23know that there are equilibria in which consumers choose not to make their
choic= contingent on s (or equivalently, make the same choic~ for the
two different valu~ of s.) These are the perfect foresight equilibria we have
already calculated. If we find that there are other equilibria in which output
and prices vary with the realization of s, we will say that the equilibrium
exhibits expectational indeterminacy. This, we think, is a more sugg~tive
description of the behavior in qu=tion than the conventional label of a
“sunspot equilibrium.”
The timing of the realization of s and of decisions is as follows. In
period t – 1, total potential output is realized. Consumers make decisions
about how much to consume and how much to invest. Given the net-of-
depreciation stocks of machines (1 – d) Kt- 1 and the stock of designs At_ 1,
their d~isions about how much to invest will determine the total stock
of capital Zt that will be carried over into period t. At the beginning of
period t, the value of St is realized, Firms then make their decisions about
production contingent on the observed value ofs, In particular, they decide
how to split the new investment between additions to K and increas= in
A. When s signals fast growth, firms will allocate more of their investment
to increase in A because a design is more valuable when the economy is
growing rapidly. Given these decisions by firms, total output will be realized
at the end of period t. Consumers observe the state St and decide how much
to consume and how much to save, In the high growth and high interest
rate state, they will save more and consume less. (This posit ive r~ponse
of savings to increwes in the inter~t rate follows from our assumption that
the parameter o in the utility function is 1=s than one.) Thus, Z will tend
to increase by a larger factor during high growth states. Undepreciated
capital and the saving decision of households then determine the quantity
of capital Zt+l which is carried into t + 1 and must once again be divided
between increasa in K and A.
This is the minimal extension of our perfect foraight framework in which
we can consider the possibility of expectational indeterminacy — the possi-
bility that the behavior of the economy is determined partly by expectations
that are not fully determined by the fundamentals of the economy. This
extension nevertheless introduces a substantial degree of additional com-
plexity into the model, In particular, the variable Sf introduces a second
state variable into the analysis, so it is no longer possible to solve for a single
growth rate and interest rate that characterize the equilibria. For any given
24value of the state variable Z, there will be two different choices, indexed by
s, that firms will make regarding additional investment in K and A. For
any given level of total output, consumers will make two different choices,
indexed by s, about how much to consume and save. They will be guided
by two different interest rat- that can also be indexed by s. As long as
the transition probabilities are positive, decisions in one state will depend
on the growth and interat rates that will obtain in the other state, so the
state-specific growth rates and interest rates are simultaneously determined.
The structure of the model still permits us to reduce the system for the full,
infinite dimensional dynamic equilibrium to system with a finite number of
quations and unknowns, but it is not a system that can be reduced in any
meaningful way to a two-equation, two-variable graphical analysis of the
kind that was pmsible for the perfect foresight equilibria. (The equations
for this system are given in the appendix.)
One straightforward way to study the behavior of a system of equations
is to look for numerical solutions. We pr=ent one such solution that us=
the same parameter values and functional forms that we used in calculating
the two stable perfect formight equilibria in Section 2. The only difference
here is that we allow for a 5~0 probability that between any two periods,
the economy switches from the high growth to the low growth state or vice
versa. Table 2 and 3 provide the description of such a growth cycle that
we calculated numerically.
TABLE 2: Growth rates in a growth cycle with HII = H22 = 0.95.
(s,, s,+,) = (Z,j) gz(z) g~(z, j)
------
(1, 1) 1.0083 1.0014
(1,2) 1.0083 1.0053
(2, 1) 1.0437 1.0032
(2, 2) 1.0437 1.0072
25TABLE 3: Other variables in a growth cycle with
rI~~ = 1122= 0.95.
St r(z) p’(i) ; (2)
------ --—.—
~ = 1 (),()383 1.435 0.978
z = 2 ().0518 1.565 0.881
In this equilibrium with expwtational indeterminacy, K and A always
grow between periods t and t + 1, regardless of the valuea taken on by st
and St+l. This means that we do not have to consider the issues that would
arise if firms wanted to disinvest. In the two states, the consumption-
income ratio C/Y vari= as one would expect given our assumption that
savings responds posit ively to increases in returns. on the firm side, invet-
ment behavior would be dominated by firm perceptions about the state of
aggregate demand and the rate of growth in the near term. Investment by
any individual firm would go up when interest rates are higher and growth
is more rapid. Finally, note the relatively small amount of variation in the
price of capital goods p’ compared to the markedly different values that
it takes on in the two different perfect for=ight equilibria. This reflects
the weight given by forward looking agents to the pmsibility of a transition
between high and low growth states. It also reflects the changes in their
behavior that foresight induc=.
3.2 Existence and Stability of Growth Cycles under
Learning
It is no accident that the growth cycle that we calculated numerically gen-
erates growth and inter=t ratea that are close to the values that arise in
the two perfect for=ight equilibria we constructed in Section 2. As we have
already noted, the perfect foresight equilibria can be thought of as solu-
tions to the model in which agents do not make their decisions contingent
on the value of s, It is also possible to interpret them as solutions where
decisions do depend on the realization of s but where the transition proba-
biliti~ between the two states are zero. In this limiting caae, the decisions
26that firms and consumers make in the two states can be uncoupld. The
problems they face reduce to the problems considered in the perfect fore-
sight analysis. Bmause the system of equations depends smoothly on the
transition probabilities, the implicit function theorem tells us that for tran-
sition probabilities near zero, the behavior of the economy in the high or
low growth state will be close to the behavior of the economy in the corre-
sponding perfect foresight equilibrium. Quantities and prices will be close
to the perfect for=ight values, Moreover, as we will show, if the individual
perfect foresight equilibria are stable under learning, then the full equilib-
rium with expectational indeterminacy that switches between states that
are near these equilibria will also be stable under lmrning.
It is easiest to establish both the existence r~ult and the convergence
result at the same time. To do so, we must first describe what the learning
dynamic is in our full equilibrium with expectational indeterminacy. For the
case of perfect foresight, we formulated a model of lmrning based on a single
variable, the expected interest rate. We must now extend this approach to
the full model in which variablea can depend on St.
The equations that determine the full equilibrium can be interpreted as
a mapping that takes a pair of expected interest rates (r;, ~~) to a pair of
r-lized interest rates (rl, r2):
(12)
(The equations themselves are presented in the appendix.) The equilib-
rium with expectational indeterminacy is a fixed point of this mapping
with values rl # r2. Recall from the previous discussion of learning what
the interpretation of this mapping is. If households make savings decisions
on the assumption that the interest rates r;, and T; will prevail in the two
states and if producers expect consumers to persist with savings behavior
that this induces, then the production side of the market will clear at the
inter=t rates rl and ~2 in the two different states. That is, rl and r2 will be
consistent with zero expected profit for an entrant into the invention of new
goods. In the hypothetical dynamic determined by the learning process, the
time t realized inter~t rate rt would be given by
~t = Ti(TY,t, rj,t)ifst=i, fori=l,2, (13)
where ~i denot= the i’th component of the mapping ~.
27We adopt the following simple state contingent adaptive learning scheme,
In state s, agents will compare the inter=t rate they expected to obtain in
this state with the interest rate that actually obtains. They will then ad-
just their expectation of inter~t rates in this state in the direction of the
rmlized int crest rate. As before, the amount of the adjustment depends on
the amount of data that they have already collected:
In this expr~sion, iVi(t) repr=ents the number of times the variable St has
taken value z up until time t. Equations (13) and (14) define a dynamic
system in the two variables T;, T; that is driven by the exogenous stochastic
variable st.
An equilibrium growth cycle, i.e., a rational expectations equilibrium
with expwtational indeterminacy, is a fixed point (TI,Tz) of (12) in which
rl # Tz, When we want to be explicit, we can express these equilibrium
interest rates as functions of the underlying transition probabilities, rl (H)
and rz (II). Let I denote the two-by-two identity matrix. It corresponds
to a degenerate transition probability matrix with no changes in the initial
state. With this notation, we can describe conditions under which a non-
degenerate growth cycle exists and ,which has the property that for nearby
initial conditions, the sequenca of state dependent interest ratm generated
by the learning dynamics converge to the stat~dependent interest rates that
obtain in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the model outlind in section 2 has two dis-
tinct, perfect foresight, balancd growth equilibria. Let the mapping T be
as defind in that section, so that the interest rates corresponding to these
quilibtia satisfy TL = T(?’L) and rH = T(rH) and assume, without loss
of generality, that rL < rH. Suppose that these two values both satisfy the
perfect foresight stability criterion, T’(rL ) <1 and T’(rH ) <1. Then there
etists a neighborhood of the identity matrix I with the property that for any
transition probability matrix 11 in thti neighborhood, there is an equilibm”um
growth cycle (rl (~), r2(~)) nmr (rL, rH) which ti locally stable under the
learning dynamics (13) and (lJ).
The proof of the Proposition, together with a precise statement of the
phrase “locally stable under learning”, is given in the Appendix,
28Finally, we note that we have verified directly that the numerical ex-
ample presented in the last section is locally stable in the natural sense.
If one starts with guesses about the inter~t rates and growth rates that
will obtain in the growth cycle and iterates using the learning dynamic, the
resulting values for the interest rates and the growth rates converge to the
equilibrium values for the growth cycle. In fact, we used a version of this
method to calculate the growth cycle itself.
4 Discussion of Related Literature
Models with multiple equilibria are potentially of interest for understanding
both macroeconomic fluctuations and economic development. In the de-
velopment process, we observe substantial diversity of growth rata among
countri= at similar levels of income. We also observe that the direct foreign
investment that flows from advanced countria to poor countries tends to
be highly concentrated in a small number of rapidly growing countries. The
model that we have developed has an obvious application in this setting,
one that is already suggested by Alwyn Young’s (1993) model with multi-
ple growth rat=. Different countries find themselv= in dfierent equilibria.
Countries in the high growth, high inv~tment equilibrium attract high lev-
els of foreign investment. The crucial policy steps are those that initiate
the transition from the low growth to the high growth equilibrium. These
issu= d=erve a separate treatment and we do not pursue them here. 10
As indicated in the introduction, there are many strands in the literature
on aggregate models with some form of indeterminacy or multiplicity of
equilibria. We now review how the model of this paper fits into this extensive
literature.
One strand (surveyed in Gu=nerie and Woodford 1992) focuses on the
possibility of endogenous fluctuations in dynamic economies such as over-
lapping generations models. Another strand has str=sed complementariti=
in the decision making of different agents that arise from externalities or
imperfect competition. These complementarit ies can lead to multiple equi-
10s= the ~uvey byMat~uyama (1995) for a discussion of the relevance Of mOdels with
multiple equilibria and multiple steady stat= to the development e~erience, Benhabib
and Gali (1995) ak use th=e kinds of models to characterize the behavior of different
developing countries.
29libria, sometimes even to a continuum of quilibria, Recent surveys include
Matsuyama (1995) and Silvestre (1993), Many of these models do not,
however, explicitly construct rational expectations models with endogenous
fluctuations arising from expectational indeterminacy. A new strand, dis-
cussed below, emphasizes the possibility of multiple equilibria in models of
growth.
our model is not closely related to models derived from Brock (1975)
that hinge on the special properti~ of fiat money; nor to models that follow
Calvo (1978) or Cass and Shell (1983) and allow for overlapping generations
of agents; nor to models in the tradition of Diamond (1982) that depend
on search externalities in the labor market; nor to models such as Wood-
ford (1991) that depend on special aspects of imperf=t competition. As
macroeconomists, we are not convinced that the mechankms identified in
th=e papers are plausible mechanisms for generating expectat ional indeter-
minacy in real economies. However, as economic theorists, we have been
able to take advantage of the insights that have developed in the exploration
of these models, To cite just one example, our analysis of stability under
learning builds on results developed by Hewitt and McAfee (1992) in the
context of a model with search externalities in the labor market,
In the early literature, our model is most clmely related to two papers.
One, by Andrei Shleifer (1986), examin~ a model in which innovation is
motivated by monopoly profit. The second paper, by John Bryant (1983),
allows for a strong from of complementarily between a large number of in-
termediate inputs in production. Our model can be thought of as an explicit
dynamic extension that incorporat~ elements from both of th~e models.
More recent work on complementarities and imperfect competition has been
formulated either using models with unique equilibria with large multipliers,
e.g. Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), or models with expectational indetermi-
nacy, e.g. Chatterjee, Cooper, and Ravikumar (1993). The formal methods
used in these papers are different, but the substantive economic assumptions
are qualitatively the same. We have chosen the latter approach because it
locates the explanation for economic fluctuations squarely on expectations.
The unexpected discovery that growth models sometimes exhibit various
forms of indeterminacy or multiplicity of equilibria lent new impetus to
work on thee issuw, 11 Like these papers, our model has itS Origins in a
11 FO= reCent ~Ork inthis ~ra, see Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Benhabib ~d Perli
30model of long-run growth, but there is a fundamental difference. Many of
the other approaches based on models of growth generate the underlying
multiplicity y of equilibria by demonstrating the existence of a continuum of
perfect foresight equilibria. Typically, this is done by linearizing a model
around a single steady state that can be approached along an infinite number
of paths. In contrast, our underlying growth model has strong nonlinearities
result ing in a finite number of distinct balanced growth paths with perfect
foresight.
Models with a continuum of equilibria approaching a single steady state
can offer a novel strategy for justifying the stickin- of pric= and the power
of monetary policy, If there exists a continuum of equilibrium prices and
quantities, a natural focal equilibrium at any point in time is one that mak=
pric= today equal to prices yesterday. (See Farmer 1991, and Beaudry and
Devereux 1993 for models of this type.) However, a potential difficulty with
solutions in the neighborhood of an indeterminate steady state is that they
may not to be robust under learning. For example, in the simpl=t model
in this genre (the overlapping generations model with money) Lucas (1986)
found that adaptive learning schemes selected the determinate rather than
the indeterminate steady stat e. Evans and Honkapohja (1994) confirm this
lack of robustness for a somewhat more general class of models.
Another type of indeterminacy in growth models, described in the survey
by Benhabib and Gali (1995), r~ults from the prmence of a finite number
of distinct steady states. 12 For some initial value of the state variablm in
these models, there may be a finite number of discrete equilibrium paths,
each of which leads to a distinct steady state, In contrast to our model,
these models have steady stat= in levels of per capita income that grow at
(1994), Charnley (1993), Farmer and Guo (1994), Gali (1994), and Xie (1994). For general
discussions see Kehoe, Levine and ~mer (1992), Benhabib and Rustichini (1994), and
Benhabib and Gali (1995). The emnomic assumptions required for local indeterminacy
are in zome cases possibly extreme. For example, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and
Fzrmer and Guo (1994) require increasing mzrginal returm to labor. (See S&mitt-Groh6
1995 for a discussion of the assumptions required in vzrious modelz. ) In other cases the
fit with the data is ponr in dimensions we regard as crucizl. For example Gali (1994)
obtains expectational indeterminaq only when the procyclicality of the inv=tment share
k weak.
12These ~n ~ri~e, for example, bemuze Of threshold effects ae in Azmiadis and Dra=n
(1990), or because of various kinds of incr~ing returns. Again, sw the discussion in
Matsuyama (1995).
31the same steady state growth rate or which do not grow at all.
Our approach is similar in the sense that we start from an underlying
model with a finite number of distinct equilibria rather than a continuum
of equilibria. However, in our case, three distinct equilibria have different
growth rates rather than different steady state levels. Starting from any
initial condition, faat growth and slow growth are possible. Like Start z
(1994), we adopt this approach because of empirical work showing that a
two-state model with a high growth and a low growth state givea a reason-
ably good description of the variation in US economic growth (Hamilton,
1989), Drugeon and Wigniolle (1996) have also developed a model of en-
dogenous growth with Markovian fluctuations in growth rates, but they, like
Startz, rely on the assumption of positive technological externalities which
we have worked hard to avoid.
To sum up this discussion, at a formal level our model exhibits multiple
distinct balanced growth paths, We show that simple l=rning rul= in
this setting can lead to solutions exhibiting expectational indeterminacy,
with economic growth switching stochastically between high and low rates.
The crucial economic assumptions in our growth model are those we regard
aa the most plausible: fixed cats in R&D and complementarities between
capital goods. These elements yield a model of economic fluct uat ions driven
by self-fufilling shifts in investment expectations, and taking the form we
regard as most plausible: the strength of business confidence depends on
short and medium term forecasts of the rate at which future sales and profits
are expected to expand.
5 Conclusions
The fundamental challenge for macro= onomists is to identify mechanisms
that can amplify small shocks to produce large, coordinated aggregate fluc-
tuations. Some kind of amplification is necessary, for if the shocks were as
large as the fluctuations themselvm, they would be obvious for all to see.
The difficulty that economists have had in identifying and agreeing on these
shocks suggests that they are not large and obvious.
The real businms cycle literature focuses on shocks to the technology.
Existing models generally do not have large multipliers, and no one has been
able to provide any dir=t evidence for technology shocks with the required
32amplitude and persistence, The absence of candidate shocks is particu-
larly clear in the context of the Great Depression of the 1930s. So far as
we know, no real businms cycle theorist has proposed that events during
this decade repr~ent Pareto optimal adjustments to exogenous technology
shocks, The alternative new Keyn~ian position (once known as the Mon-
etarist position) holds that nominal prices do not adjust, so that monetary
dist urbanc~ are translated into real dist urbancm, 13 Ever since Friedman
and Schwartz published A Monetary Htitory of the Unitd States (1963),
the evidence implicating monetary disturbance= during the 1930s has been
the foundation for a widespread belief in the power of monetary policy.
Even so, the depression pos= a challenge for the sticky-price interpretation
of economic fluctuations that is almost as serious as the one it posm for real
business cycle theorists. None of the existing explanations for the stickiness
of prica seem capable of explaining the extraordinary persistence of the
downturn experienced during that decade.
For us, expectational indeterminacy offers a means to provide a pre-
cise, macroeconomic foundation for the amplification of shocks and a way
to explain the persistence of low growth stat~, To keep the discussion spe-
cific, we tr-t the shocks that initiate the switches between boom and bust
as monetary shocks, but nothing in our treatment depends on this inter-
pretat ion, one could equally well assume that the underlying shocks are
shocks to the technology or external shocks that impinge from the rest of
the world. The key point is that a model based on expectational indeter-
minacy is consistent with a variety of interpretations about the underlying
sources of shocks.
our formulation has made several carefully chosen simplifying assump-
tions. In general, a rational expectations ~uilibrium in a dynamic model is
a fixed point in an infinite dimensional space, The equilibrium we calculate
specifi= pric= and quantiti= for every date t and for every history of real-
izations of the random policy variable from date O up to date t.Because of
the special structure that we impose on our model, this very difficult infinite
dimensional fixed point problem can be rduced to a relatively tractable sys-
tem with a small number of equations and unknowns, This simplification is
pmsible because the underlying growth model does not have any transition
dynamics. In a perfect for=ight equilibrium, the dynamic behavior at every
ISs= B~l -d Ma~iw (1994) for a recent statement of this pOsitiOn.date, can be summarized by a single number, the rate of growth of output.
This number is independent of the history leading up to this date. Several
different perfect for=ight equilibria can be summarized by a growth rate
that is specific to each. This very special propetiy arises because a combi-
nation of simplifying msumpt ions. The first is that there is only one state
variable in the model, the stock of total capital Z, Different value of Z
change the effective size of the economy, but because the technology is scale
independent, choices at every date are merely scaled up versions of choic=
at every other date, The second assumption is that output grows linearly
with Z. The third is that utility takes the usual, constant elasticity form,
Any departure from these assumptions will make it impossible to reduce
the characterization of an equilibrium to a finite set of equations and un-
knowns. This means that any exploration of the theoretical issues raised
here is very tightly constrained by tmhnical feasibility, and constrained in
ways that have important substantive implications. One of the most im-
portant restrict ions comes on the preference side of the model. For an
investment boom to be self-sustaining, higher rates of return on investment
must induce a larger quantity of invmtment. To achieve this with constant
elasticity preferences u(C) = * cl–”, we must choose a value of a E (O, 1).
We know from other kinds of evidence that this entire family of preferenc=
cannot simultaneously give a good description of the intertemporal elastic-
ity substitution and attitudes toward risk and that even within this family
a value of a in this range may not be particularly plausible. There are a
variety of plausible extensions of the preference side of the model that can
lead to the requird r=ult - that inv~tment increasm as a fraction of out-
put during a boom. However, it will be a challenge to craft a model that
incorporates th-e extensions and still is tractable.
The other obvious compromise with tractability in the model comes in a
specification that forces all investment goods to be complements with each
other. A more realistic specification would allow for clusters of goods to
be complements with each other and that lets different clusters act as sub-
stitutes. Typewriters, carbon paper, and correction fluid are complements.
So are laser printers, personal computers, and word processors, These two
clusters of goods are substitutes for each other. In this kind of world, we
suspect that the forces we derive from the presence of complement arities
would be even stronger than they are in the current model. What comple-
mentarily does in the model is influence the timing of investment decisions.
34The preferred time to introduce a good is when its complementary goods
are being introduced. The intent ive to group these investment decisions
will be even stronger if the expected lifetime of a given cluster of goods
is likely to be cut short by the introduction of some cluster of substitutes
that will soon replace them. In this direction as well, we believe that there
are natural extensions of our model, but they may not lead to the kind of
simple analysis of expectational indeterminacy that we have been able to
conduct.
Given the compromises that are forced upon us by our dmire to be
rigorous and explicit in our analysis, it is not a simple or straightforward
matter to gauge the empirical plausibility of the process we describe. The
correct place to start, it seems to us, is with the basic pr=umptions that
drive everything else. The first is that aggregate investment can increase
sharply in response to perceptions of increased opportunist y. The second
is that the time to invest is precisely when others are investing. More
structures raise the ret urns to inv=t ment in equipment and furnishings.
Better computer hardware raises the ret urn on investment in new computer
software and vice versa. The time to buy may be precisely when everyone
else is buying and questions about standards have at least temporarily been
resolvd.
Evaluating the evidence on thee kinds of interaction effects and their
influence on the timing of investment decisions may be fairly complicated.
In particular, it may require more disaggregation that is typical for most
typ- of investment goods. The timing issues that a manufacturer faca in
upgrading the hardware and software that run computer controlled machine
tools may be at least as complicated as the timing decisions that someone
operating a desktop computer faces in deciding whether to upgrade an op-
erating system, but nothing in the aggregate equipment invatment figura
is likely to signal the importance of this kind of effect.
The kind of theoretical exercise undertaken here do= not prove anything
about the quantitative importance of complementarily or market power. All
it can do is demonstrate that it is possible that these effects lead to self-
fulfilling expectational booms and busts. once this is established, we maybe
encouraged to look at the data from a slightly different persp~tive. When
we do, we may find that there is some basis for this old conjecture that
changm in exp=tations are the major sources of fluctuations in aggregate
inv=t ment spending.
35A Appendix
A.1 Characterizing the perfect foresight equilibria
We will derive the general expression for the no-arbitrage condition depicted
in’ Figure 3. The monotonically increasing version depicted in Figure 2
emergm as a special case.
Final goods producers are price takers in the market for capital goods.
In equilibrium they equate the rental rate with the marginal product of
capital
Rt(j) = g= L1-a(JAzt(2,.d2)’-’tiz,(jl.-l. (15,
ax, (j)
The firms that supply capital goods act as monopolistic competitors. For-
mally, they purchase general purpose capital Z and convert it into special-
ized types of capital goods at the rate of one unit of general purpose capital
for one unit of specialized differentiated capital. Our timing convention im-
plie that production is realizd at the end of a period. At the end of period
t, a capital-goods supplier will earn revenue Rt (j)zt (j). In the beginning of
period t,it takes Zt (j) units of Z to produce the Zt (j) units of capital of
type j that this firm owns and rents out, The rental cost on these units of
Z is rtzt (j)p~, WhereP; is the price in units of consumption of one unit of
Z. A fraction d of the capital goods depreciates in period t, so the total
cost to the capital goods supplier in period t is (rt + d)zt (j)p~. This firm
selects its output to maximize profits, taking as given the inverse demand
curve for the rental price in equation (15) and the price p=, This lmds to
the mark-up rule
Rt(j) = (rt + d)p;/~ = R(rt, p:). (16)
Since this holds for each intermediate good j we have, by symmetry, that
the provision of intermediate goods is at the same level for all types j and we
denote its common value at time t by zt (j) = zt. It follows that aggregate
output at time t isgiven by




“ = ‘A”-” 47
(18)
with Rt given by (16).
The mark-up pricing rule impli= that the quantity of each type of in-
termediate good is a function of At, p’ and r. By substitution it follows
that profits (at the end of period t) for each type of intermediate good are
given by
mt = Rt~t–(rt+d)p;~t = (l–~)RtiZt = QAt= ((Tt + d)p;)”’(=-l) , (19)
where ~ = @l/(l–a)(l – y)~*L.
To produce a particular type of intermediate good j, a firm must first
incur the cost of inventing and dwigning this good. Recall that the cost
of a new invention for good j is j~ units of investment goods Z where
$>0. Because the firms are monopolistic competitors, at each time t the
quantity of designs is determined by a zero profit condition which states
that the fixed cost of the last design created at time t must be just equal
to the present discounted value of the str=m of monopoly rents it offers.
In a perfect foresight equilibrium with balanced growth, the interest rate
is constant and the rquired zero profit condition for the marginal good
invented at time t (which will have an index j = At) is given by
This expression for discounted profits reflects our assumption that the cost
of inventing a good is incurred at the start of period t but the first profit
is not realized until the end of the period, and hence is discountd back to
the beginning of the period by a factor (1 + r)- 1, Under the assumption
of balanced growth, the rate of growth of designs At+l /At = gA will be
constant, Substituting (19) into this sum giv=
m
pzA: = Ats Q((r + d)pz)--’)’--) ~(g~)’(1 + r)-(s+l).
S=o
37Because we assume that ~ = ~, we can cancel A: and sum the series to
obtain the zero profit condition
92 = 1 +T – Q(p’)’l/(l-a) (r+ d)-~1(1-~). (20)
Gras investment is equal to the net increase in Z minus a correction
for the depreciation of physical capital goods, Let q repr=ent the fraction
of Z that is allocated to physical capital goods, We will derive an expres-
sion for q in what follows. Production of general purpose capital Z takes





(Recall that the function x(.) specifid in (10) giv~ the tradeoff between
consumption and Z),




Zt = ztAt + i~di = xtAt + —
o 1+~”
(21)
Along a balanced growth path, the output-capital ratio Y/Z, the growth rate
of capital, the inter~t rate and p’ are constant, Using (18) to substitute
for xt, one obtains an
Z~ = A:+t
expression for Zt in terms of At:
Note that we have defined a function p(R) as a shorthand expr~ion for
the term in bracm in this equation, Since qt = Atrt/Zt, it follows from (21)
and (22) that
1
q(Rt)= 1- (~+ &;p(Rt)
Thus we can express the price of general purpme capital as
p’ =X’ (gZ – 1 +dq(R(r,pz))) .
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(23)Finally, from the above exprmsion (22) for Zz it follows that gz = g~+(.
Substituting in the expression (20) for gA and using ~ = ~ we have
[ 9Z = 1 +T – Q(p’)-l/(1-a) 1
–./(1–.) &
(T+d) . (24)
Together, equations (23) and (24) give an implicit definition of the locus
of pairs (g, r) that are consistent with the zero profit condition. In the
special case where x is the identity, p’ is a constant that can be taken to
be equal to 1 and equation (24) alone determines this locus. These loci are
the “technology” curv~ in Figures 2 and 3.
To complete the analysis of the perfect for=ight equilibrium, it remains
to verify that consumption and the stock of Z grow at the same rate. Note
first that if we substitute (18) into (17), this generates an expression for
Yt in terms of At. Using the expression for Z in terms of A from equation
(22), it follows that the ratio of output to total capital is constant along a
balanced growth path:
(25)
Next, we solve for the optimal pattern of consumption by the method
of undetermined coefficients. We guess that consumption takes the form
Ct = OZt and solve for 8, Using the first order condition for the consumer’s
maximization problem, it follows that
gz = [@(l +7)]+ . (26)
Finally, we note that we can use equation (10) to conclude that
O(T,pz) = A(R(r,pz)) – x{~(l + r)] ’/” – 1 + dq(R(r, pz))}. (27)
Provided one can show that gz < 1 + r, the transversality condition at
infinity for the consumer’s maximization problem will also be satisfied. This
impli= that the conjectured solution for consumption satisfies the sufficient
conditions for opt imality.
39It remains for us to specify the parameters we used in the calculation
of our numerical example and the precise form we selected for the function
x. In the calculation of the two stable perfect foresight equilibria, we used
the following parameter values: a = 0.4,0 = .015, ~ = 4, d = 0.15, @ =
.962, u = 0.21, L = 0.356244889.
A continuous, piecewise linear form ~ underlying the x function was
constructed as follows: 2(O) = O, x’(y) = PO for Y < VI, X’(V) = P1 for
V1 < Y < Y2, and X’(Y) = P2 for Y > V2 The smoothed function sets
x(~)=~(y)fory<ul–~l,yl +~l<y<gz–fiz,andy>uz +
82. In the interval (yl – 61, yl + 61] x(y) is the quadratic which satisfies
X(Y1 – ~1) = ~(Yl – 61), x’(Y1 – 61) = 1’ (Y1 – Al) Similarly, in the interval
(YZ -82, YZ + 62] x(y) is another quadratic satisfying X(Y2 - 62) = 1(Y2 -
62), x’(Y2 – 62) = X’(Y2 – 62).For the numerical example we selected the
values p. = 0.555406, p1 = 1.46523,p2 = 5.06686, yl = 0.0199733, yz =
0.0535351, f51= .001,62 = .0005.
Finally, we must verify that discounted utility is finite along all feasible
growth paths and that the transversality condition at infinity is satisfied
for the consumer. To =tablish both of these results, it is sufficient to show
that the maximum feasible rate of growth satisfi= g~j~ < ~ TO do this, we
impose an additional constraint on the function x which limits the maximum
feasible rate of growth of Z. Specifically, we assume that x’(y) goes to
infinity for valu= of y above a threshold y~=. In our numerical example,
the high growth rate for Z satisfies the inequality g= < ~ = ~g~ u, so we
know that we can pick a value of y~= that is strictly larger than the value of
y that obtains in the high growth state. It follows that the imposition of this
upper bound will not change the value of the perfect foresight equilibria
that we have calculated without imposing this bound, so we are free to
impose it after the fact without redoing our numerical calculations.
A.2 Characterizing the equilibria with expectational
indeterminacy
Once we introduce the random variable s, both households and firms face
uncertainty about the state of the world in the subsequent period. We must
therefore introduce state contingent prices for output. Let q(s~, St+l) denote
the price at the end of time tof one unit of output available at the beginning
of period t + 1, contingent on the realimtion of St+l. Thus q(st, St+l) pric=
40only the uncertainty associated with the realization of St+l, Formally, we
~sume that no clock time claps= during this interval, The pricing of goods
over time is associated with a state contingent interest rate r(st) which
denot~ the sure net l-period interest rate on consumption good loans over
the interval extending from the beginning of period t to the end of period
t, Thus the q’s price only the uncertainty and r’s prices only the time lag.
Since one unit of output in state st at the end of period t necessarily is one
unit of output in either state 1 or 2 at the beginning of period t+ 1, we
have the b~ic arbitrage formulas
q(i,l) +q(i,2) = 1 for 2 = 1,2. (28)
We need to restate all of the equations for the consumer and firms in
terms that allow for the uncertainty associated with s. We begin with
the arbitrage relationship for firms. The problem for the producer of the
final good continues to be a static, one period problem, so we can write
Rt(~) = * J “ust as we did before. This producer considers only the
rental cost Rt of the specialized capital goods that it uses. In contrast,
the firms that produce, own, and rent out these specialized capital goods
now must worry about capital gains or lmses on their goods that may be
induced by changes in the price of general purpose capital, p’. When the
economy switches to a slow growth equilibrium, the rate of inv=tment falls.
This makes the cost of new capital goods fall, which maka the value of all
existing capital goods fall, We can-price the uncertainty facing the producer
of a specialized type of capital using q(si, St+l) and the price p’. End-of-
period profits for the firm supplying the specialized intermediate capital
good j are
[R,(j) (st)zt(j) + (1 - d)pz(l)zt(j)]q(st, 1) +
[Rt(~)(st)~t(~) + (1 - ~)Pz(2)~t(j)19(st, 2) - (1 + ~(st))pz(st)z,(j).
Maximizing profits then leads to the equation
R(st) = ~-’ [(1+ r(st))pz(st) – (1 – d) (pz(l)q(st, 1) +pz(2)q(st, 2))]
for St = 1,2. As before, Rt(j) = Rt and Zt (j) = Xt turn out not to depend
[1 Eyti,
on j and (18) becomes zt(s~) = LAt
41It is convenient to introduce the notation
Pz(~t) = Pz(l)9(st, 1) +pz(2)q(st, 2) for st = 1,2 (29)
for the “expected” price of capital. End-of-period profits are given by
‘[,.(~)++(%)+ ~t = LA; -” 1
[(1 - d)pz(st) -(1+ Tap’] .
This lads us to define the profit function as
m(st, At) = A~~I’(R(st), @z(st), r(st), Pz(st)),
where
[ (;)fi+(;)~[(l-d,, z-(l+r)p.,]. r(~, ~z, r,p’) -L 07
Note that the equation for the rent al rate can be rewritten
R(st) = y-l[(l + r(st))pz(st) – (1 – d)@z(st)] for st = 1,2. (30)
The decisions to introduce designs are also dynamic and made under
uncertainty. It is most convenient to approach the problem in terms of
asset pricing. Let P(st, At ) denote the price of one unit of designs in period
t contingent on the state st and the aggregate quantity of designs At. After
they have been introduced, all designs are equivalent, so we can use a single
price for all of them. Since each unit of daign capital yields current profits
m(st, At), we have the arbitrage (or zero profit) condition
‘(s” 1) (T(S,, At)+P(l, At+l))+ ~qf:(:) (m(st,At)+P(2, At+,)). P(st, At) = I + ~(st)
At every date, the price of a unit of design capital is determined by the cost
of producing the last d=ign,
P(st, At) = Afpz(st).
42Writing g,4(st, s~+l) = At+ I(st+l)/At (st) for the rate of growth of design
capital and combining the above equations we obtain the equations:
~=(z) = (I+ ~(i)) -l[r(R(i),pz(i), ~(i), p”(i))]+ (31)
(1+ r(i)) -’[q(i, 1)~’(l)g~(i, I)f + q(i, 2)~z(2)gA(i, 2)(]
fori=l,2.
We look for a solution in which O and gz are functions of the current
state z of st. The ratio of total investment to inv=t ment in designs is given
by
‘(1 + ~)(Zt/A:+c)(st) = (1 + ~)p(~(st))>
where p is defined by equation (22). From the preceding equation the 4




p(R(z)) ‘1+<)-1 , for~ ~ = ~,z
7 (32)
p(R(j))
Turning to the household, there are now Euler equations for the two
state contingent assets which pay one unit of consumption at t + 1 in a




9(st, St+l) *(St> St+l) 1= prI(st)st+,)(l +r’(st+,))
Here II(st, st+l) is the transition probability from state st to s~+l. We will
also use the notation IIij = H(i, j), i, j = 1, 2. The optimal solution for the
household allows its consumption to capital ratio to depend on the state St:
(et/zt)(st) = /3(s,).
Combining th=e last two equations yields
[1
o(j) a
P~ij(l+~e(j)) = q(~,j) ~9z(~) for i,j = 1,2. (33)
Additional restrictions on the values of O(Z) come from the product trans-
formation function (10) which holds state by state. Thus we have a state-
contingent version of equation (27):
O(i) = J(R(z)) – X[gz(i) – 1 + dq(R(i))] for z = 1,2. (34)
43Finally, we also have the state contingent version of the capital price equa-
tion (23)
j’(i) = X’(gz(i) – 1 + dq(R(i))) for i = 1,2, (35)
and the rational expatiations condition
~(i) = T’(2) for 2 = 1,2. (36)
The equations (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35) and (36) form a
system of 22 nonlinear quations in the 22 unknowns r(i), T’(z), R(i), q(i, j),
O(Z),P’(z), p’(z), gA(i, j), and gz (z). Th=e characterize an equilibrium with
expectational indet~rminacy. Toget her, they implicit ly determine the map
ping (r(l), T(2)) = T(re(l), T’(2)) d~cribed in the main text.
‘.,3 Existence and Stability of Growth Cycles
For notational convenience write ~i = ~(i) and ~~ = r’(i) for i = 1,2. We
now sketch the proof of the proposition given in the text and show that
generically there exist growth cycle for probabilities in a neighborhood of
the identity matrix when there are distinct perfect foresight balanced growth
paths. Let r~, TH denote the inter~ rat- for two distinct balanced growth
paths. By assumption TL # TH. Define a new function
W((T1, T2), (1111,H22)) = T((T1, T2),(~11 ,~zz))– (TI,T2),
where we have made the dependence of the map ~(. ) on the probabilities
Hll, H22 explicit. If we introduce vmtor notation ~ = (T1, T2) and H =
(Hll, H22), we can write the key condition of the implicit function theorem
s the requirement that the matrix DrW, evaluatd at that pair of steady
stat=, is nonsingular.
By inspecting equations (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35) and
(36)1 it is seen that for the first component of W we have
wl((Tl,T2), (l,n22)) = T(rl) –~1 for vT1, T2, ~22, (37)
where T(r) is given by equation (8). To show this we first note that
Hll = 1 implia q(l, 1) = 1. Substituting q(l, 1) = 1 into the relevant
members of equations (33) yields the preference curve (26). Second, insert-
ing q(l, 1) = 1 and q(l, 2) = O into (29), (30), and (31), and taking into
44account (32), we obtain the technolo~ curve (24). Finally, it is easily smn
that (35), (29), and (30) yield (23). A similar argument can also be made
that W2((r1, r2), (Hll, 1)) = T(~2) – r2 when H22 = 1.
From the above one can compute
(
T’(TL) – 1 0
D, W((TL, TH), (1, 1)) =
o T’(~H) – 1 )
(38)
at (rL, TH). Thus, growth cycle exist in a neighborhood of (rL, TH) pro-
vided T’(~L) # 1 and T’(~H) # 1.
Next, we consider the stability of an equilibrium under adaptive learn-
ing. Evans and Honkapohja (1994) show that the dynamics defined by
(14) are locally stable - i.e. the trajectory= starting from any point in a
neighborhood of the equilibrium converge almost surely to the equilibrium
- whenever a condition known as E-stability is satisfied. 14 For Estability
it is required that the eigenvalu= of D. ~, evaluated at quilibrium growth
cycle, have real parts less than one. By continuity of eigenvalues and (38),
this condition is met in a neighborhood of (TL, r~) provided T’(TL ) <1 and
T’(rH) <1. This prove Proposition 1.
141n fact the algorithm ~ee& to be supplemented with a “pmJeCtiOn facilitY” tO Obtain
local mnvergence with probability one. Evans and Honkapohja (1996) show that without
a proj~ion facility one can still obtain positive mnvergence results.
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